For the first time in nearly two years, home flipping returns went up. ATTOM's most recent quarterly report put the typical gross return at 25.4 percent, up from 24.7 percent the quarter before, which had been the weakest reading since 2008. Gross profit rose from $64,300 to $66,000. Seven straight quarters of decline finally broke.
That is the headline. It is also close to useless if you are buying in Texas.
Four of the five worst major metros were Texas markets
In the same quarter that produced the national uptick, Austin flips returned a typical 2.0 percent gross. Not net. Gross, before a dollar of rehab, before carry, before closing costs on either end. Four of the five lowest-returning major metros in the country were in Texas.
Compare that with Pittsburgh at 85.9 percent and Buffalo at 84.0 percent. The typical Pittsburgh flip was bought for $110,000 and resold for $204,500. Same national market, same quarter, same interest rate environment. The difference was not skill or execution. It was entry price.
That is the whole story in a line. Texas metros appreciated so hard for so long that the discount an investor needs in order to make the math work stopped showing up. You cannot manufacture spread on a house that never went on sale.
Why gross return is the wrong number to watch
This matters more than the headline figure, and the reports do not emphasize it enough.
Gross flipping profit is resale price minus purchase price. That is all. It does not subtract your rehab. It does not subtract your carry. It does not subtract closing costs on either end. ATTOM says plainly in its own methodology that renovation and holding expenses typically run between 20 and 33 percent of a property's after-repair value.
Run that against a 2 percent gross return and the picture gets ugly fast. A deal can clear its purchase price on paper and still take money out of your pocket.
If you are underwriting a Texas deal this fall on gross comps alone, you are looking at the wrong number.
What else is stretching: the calendar
Median time from purchase to resale moved to 165 days, up from 160. Five days does not sound like much until you price it.
Carry runs whether or not the work is moving. On a $300,000 loan at 11 percent interest-only, every additional month costs about $2,750. Add utilities, insurance and taxes and you are closer to $3,200. A flip that slips from four months to six just spent roughly $6,400 of margin on nothing but time.
In a 25 percent gross return environment you can absorb that. At 2 percent it is the entire deal.
How to underwrite a Texas flip this fall
Three adjustments, none of them glamorous:
Buy the discount, not the appreciation. Where entry prices are compressed against resale values, the only reliable spread comes from what you paid. That means distressed, off-market, estate sales, and properties other buyers will not touch. If a deal only works because you assume the market carries you upward, it is not a deal.
Price the exit at today's comps. Not spring's. Every month you add to the timeline is a month of assumption risk stacked on top of carry cost.
Underwrite the delay you do not expect. Build two extra months of carry into the model before you commit. If the deal survives that, it is real. If it only pencils on a perfect timeline, you are betting on something you do not control.
What is coming
ATTOM has historically published its second-quarter flipping report in mid-September, and as of this writing the second-quarter numbers have not landed. When they do, the question they answer is whether the first-quarter uptick was the start of something or one good quarter inside a longer slide.
We will cover it here when it arrives, with the Texas breakdown pulled out separately. The national average is not your market, and it never was.
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Get in touchFigures cited are from ATTOM's Q1 2026 U.S. Home Flipping Report, the most recent quarterly report available. Dominion Hard Money does not lend its own funds; we arrange financing for real estate investors through third-party lending partners.
